An Animal – Many Persons?  Animal Personhood in Face of the Modularity of Mind by Jürgens, Uta Maria
International Journal of Social Science Studies 
Vol. 4, No. 9; September 2016 
ISSN 2324-8033 E-ISSN 2324-8041 
Published by Redfame Publishing 
URL: http://ijsss.redfame.com 
19 
An Animal – Many Persons?  





Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich ETHZ, Department of Environmental Systems Science, CH-8092 Zürich, 
Switzerland. 
2 
Swiss Federal Research Institute WSL, Social Sciences in Landscape Research Group, CH-8903 Birmensdorf, 
Switzerland. 
Correspondence: Uta Maria Jürgens, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich ETHZ, Department of 
Environmental Systems Science, CH-8092 Zürich, Switzerland. 
 
Received: July 5, 2016    Accepted: July 18, 2016    Available online: July 20, 2016 
doi:10.11114/ijsss.v4i9.1754    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v4i9.1754  
 
Abstract  
This essay analyzes how the Modularity of Mind impacts the anthrozoological argument that non-human animals are 
persons. Comparative research on human and animal minds suggests that human and other-than-human minds differ in 
their mental architecture such that animal cognition is largely modular whereas human thought fluidly integrates 
contents across modules. If animal minds are modular, then the idea of non-human personhood is challenged. 
Specifically, an animal with a modularized mind would not be one person facing the world and reflecting on itself in an 
integral manner, but would be an individual made of many persons: The animal would experience one reality and one 
self pertaining to each module (or partly-integrated domain of thought) and thus “be“ one distinct person in each of 
these worlds. Yet, within the framework of human-animal encounters, animal personhood can be meaningfully 
construed despite modularity of animal minds. On this account, animal personhood is conceived by virtue of the human 
ability to meta-integrate mental contents: The human mind meta-integrates the animal mind's modularized experience 
for the animal. Thus, in human-animal interactions, humans face the animal as a functional whole, as an integral animal 
person. 
Keywords: modularity of mind, cognitive fluidity, non-human personhood, subjectivity, respective realities 
1 Introduction 
Here is a challenge for the anthrozoological community: animal personhood is a construction of the human mind. With 
this claim, I'm far from betraying the efforts of ingenious scholars of disciplines as varied as philosophy, psychology, 
ethology, sociology, anthropology, history of religion, politics, law and many others who have joined intellectual forces 
to establish animal personhood as the essential center-piece for providing the scientific, conceptual and political ground 
of a new human-animal relationship. Neither am I recanting my own attempts to assist this rethinking and restructuring 
(Jürgens, 2014; 2016). To the contrary, in this paper, I am raising a problem that no one who is interested in 
conceptually grounding the notion of non-human personhood (indeed: personhood tout court) should ignore. And I'm 
offering a solution. 
Animal, or more general, non-human personhood is an essentialist-cum-moral notion proposing that animals can (some 
say: should) be considered as unique individuals, exhibiting agency, being endowed with subjectivity, and an internal 
value just like humans. Thus, the idea of personhood is pivotal for “reshaping” the moral status of animals since it 
“identifies a category of morally considerable beings” (Gruen, 2010).  By endowing non-humans with the attribute of 
personhood, anthrozoology seeks to overcome the Western classification assigning humans and animals to different 
ontological – and hence: moral – realms. Mental architecture has played a critical role in drawing the line between 
humans and animals. Accordingly, animal personhood advocates bring arguments that rely on scientific evidence about 
animals' complex minds to the forefront in order to erase or at least push that line further down the genealogical tree 
(Brown, 2015). Mental capacities of animals have been considered within the range of sentience, the being's ability to 
experience pain, pleasure and similar basal psychophysical states, to intelligent cognition and behavior such as future 
planning or understanding the mental states of others. My intention is not to participate in the meticulous debate over 
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animals' mental capacities. We do have sufficient evidence to state that animal minds are far from being the 
behaviorists' black boxes whose content either cannot be validly accessed – or which are empty altogether. Multiple 
studies attest to animals' ingenious built-in toolkits, deliberate cunning, and emotional endowments exhibited both in 
the laboratory and in real-life circumstances (e.g. Bartal, Decety, & Mason, 2011; Bekoff, 2007; Bentley-Condit & 
Smith, 2010; Connor & Mann, 2006; Dally, Emery, & Clayton, 2010; Gallistel, 2000;   Janik, Sayigh, & Wells, 2006; 
Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Shettleworth, 2001, 2009). Moreover, not only research scientists 
but most persons who have ever lived or worked with animals can testify that animals exhibit the destinct characteristics 
of individual beings (Brown, 2015; A. M. Gentner, 2016; Ogden, 2012).  
There are passionate debates over how animals' abilities are internally realized, over whether and how these abilities are 
experientially accessible to them, and over the details of what these abilities mean in comparison to respective human 
behavior. However, there simply can be no serious question any more about whether or not animals are individuals with 
complex minds of their respective kinds. While empirical studies cannot ultimately decide on the transspecific “other 
mind problem” (Harnad, 2016; Shettleworth, 2009), i.e., the question of whether and to what extent animals are 
conscious, I have developed the concept of  “respective realities“ as a way of thinking about animal subjectivity. Every 
animal species, in fact, every human or animal individual is thought of as having his or her unique access to the one 
outside world, and I hold that these accesses are equally valid. Thus, I am firmly committed to the view that despite all 
obvious differences between human and non-human animals, and between non-human animals of the various species, 
all their respective “minds“ are perfectly nested within the one world which we all inhabit and which we perceive in our 
respectively different ways (Juergens, under review; manuscript available upon request).   
My concern, thus, is not with animal personhood when “personhood“ is being understood as the sum of the parts 
forming the psychic life with which animal individuals are endowed. What I am concerned with (and actually, about) is 
whether there is a whole integrating the psychic parts. In other words: How can we conceive of a given animal 
individual as an integral “person“ who can be a partner in human-animal encounters?  
2 The Challenge: Modularized Minds 
The complexities with conceiving animals as persons in regard to mental architecture hinges on the so-called 
modularity of mind (Fodor, 1983). Modules can be understood to be compartments of the mind each concerned with a 
specific mental process and content. The differences between different accounts of modularity (e.g. Robbins, 2010; 
Wilson, 2008), although conceptually important, need not concern us for the purpose of the present paper. It suffices to 
assume that modules are functional units, independently processing and producing information for further computation 
within subsequent modularized or centralized processes. I take for granted that the synthesis of cognitive, 
developmental, and evolutionary psychology, archeology, neuropsychology, and ethology has firmly established that at 
least, the input-systems, such as the faculties of the perceptual system, of animal and human minds function in a 
modularized manner. Moreover, there are a number of operations in subsequent “higher-order” processing in human 
and other-than-human minds which are good candidates for modules, too (e.g. Gallistel, 2000; Mausfeld, 2005, 2008; 
Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983; Mithen, 1996; Samuels, 2000; Shettleworth, 2012; Spelke & Lee, 2012). This 
account construes the mind as being structured by modules nested within modules, i.e., as a hierarchy of processes 
occupied with processing and producing domain-specific contents, and working independently from each other as well 
as from any conscious pondering (a characteristic known as “informational encapsulation”, Fodor, 1983). One module's 
output (or several modules' outputs) provide(s) the input for modules on the next level of the processing hierarchy. Thus 
when the production of information flows vertically through a mind, there is increased integration, allowing for 
“concepts of concepts” (Sperber, 1994) to be formed as higher-order mechanism operate on outputs of several lower-
order modules. If this premise is correct, then our and other animals' conscious mental lives are constituted by the final 
output of the highest-order faculties.  
The second key premise is that the human mind is special with regard to the homogeneity of its conscious mental life, 
i.e., its cognitive fluidity (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994; Mithen, 1996). Cognitive fluidity is an essential feature of the human 
mind and is constituted by an uninhibited flow of ideas across cognitive domains as apparent in e.g. language, art, 
science and religion. Cognitive fluidity allows for flexible behavior, the use of analogy and metaphor, 
multiperspectivity (Mausfeld, 2008) and other uniquely human traits unparalleled in the animal realm. This ability is 
incongruent with modular functioning of conscious cognition, and implies that either modularity is completely absent 
from the processing in human central systems (Fodor, 1983), or has been overcome as the highest-order modules 
became permeable in human phylogeny and ontogeny (Mithen, 1996). Either way, the integrate functioning of the 
human mind bespeaks its cognitive system's architecture: It must be one that allows for “meta-integration” of module 
outputs. Meta-integration, for the present purpose, might be defined as the final step of integration which occurs when 
two or more data-formats, or pieces of information, emanating from different modules, feed into one integral stream of 
experience. While this homogenous consciousness is what corresponds to human cognitive fluidity, animal cognition 
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seems to be scarcely equipped with the means to provide meta-integration of representations (Shettleworth, 2009, 2012). 
Of course, it is not adequate to lump together millions of species under the heading of “animals“ and sweepingly talk 
about “their minds”. Millions of species mean an equally diverse number of respective minds with respectively different 
architectures. Accordingly, my statements about “animals“ should be read to imply a graded validity (Chan, 2011). Yet, 
as researchers of ape cognition and palaeoanthropologists have concurrently and conclusively argued (Boesch & 
Tomasello, 1998; Gabora, 2007; Mithen, 1996; Tattersall, 1998), even our closest living and extinct relatives, 
chimpanzees and early humans, (and allegedly analogously clever animals such as corvids) lack the meta-integration of 
information which allows for the cognitive fluidity so blatantly characteristic of human thought and culture. 
Why is modularity of animal minds a challenge to animal personhood? It is a challenge because the notion of 
personhood implies that there is one integral whole person.  
If minds are modularized, however, there is not one, but there are many persons on the non-human end of a human-
animal encounter. It probably constitutes the most inconspicuous and thus most pervasive anthropomorphism to assume 
that other animals' minds, and hence: experience of the outside and inside worlds, appear as homogenous wholes to 
animals just like our minds appear to us. We seem to assume that animals' minds are less vividly populated versions of 
our own minds, with the difference being a gradual one of quantity rather than quality. 
Let us switch to a phenomenological stance for the moment of a (quite literal) “thought experiment“ in order to see 
what the presence of meta-representations in human, but not in animal minds implies for the question of animal 
experience, animal personhood and human-animal encounters. By switching to the phenomenological mode, the things 
we have technically termed “mental architecture“, i.e. minds analyzed “from without“, turn into “minds of 
within“ (Nagel, 2012): This view from within reveals the respective lifeworlds (Husserl, 2012), the respective realities 
of humans and animals (Jürgens, under review). 
We may for analytical purposes artificially distinguish two realms of a being's lifeworld: the reality “out 
there“ phenomenally constituting the world independent from the self, and the internal reality as accessible through 
introspection. Both sides of the phenomenal coin are impacted by modularity of minds; let us consider them in turn. 
We are well aware of our human experience of the outside realm: There is a “whole diversity” of things phenomenally 
lying external to ourselves and constituting the world.  This world's axiomatic presence in our subjectivity leaves no 
doubt – phenomenologically speaking – of its integrity and cohesion. We, the subjects, are firmly positioned within our 
world and stand in relations to other integrated subjects and objects that figure in it. 
This human phenomenal reality as a monolithic whole corresponds to our meta-representation of different facets of the 
world. Even though these facets are the ultimate result of the modularized processes of perception (Fodor, 1983), the 
architecture of the perceptual system itself provides for the successive integration of perceptual data formats.  For 
example, material qualities of perceptual objects such as surface shape and color are processed by the perceptual system 
to yield meaningful object properties such as edibility (Mausfeld, 2010); location and identity of an object are merged 
for us to see “what“ lies “where“ (Mishkin et al., 1983); and the sight and the sound of things are joined into, e.g. the 
perceptual entity of a barking dog. But “mapping across domains“ (Carey & Spelke, 1994) starts to run rampant once 
these already complex outputs of the perceptual system enter the cognitive level. There virtually is no limit to which 
concepts we may fuse, merge and join. We may imagine the perfect spaceship a barking dog may devise to harvest 
goodies grown in the heavens. We may conceive of the analogy that for a dog, devoted barking is structurally similar to 
a bard pouring his heart into a song. We may begin to scientifically analyze a phonograph of the dog's barking in order 
to detect patterns possibly corresponding to morsels of dog grammar. In other words, there is no limit to human thought 
when it comes to creatively combining and recombining concepts. 
In contrast, when a mind is modularized, flexible use of concepts is restricted to those domains of which these concepts 
are natural parts. Dogs may be either barking ferociously or happily; goodies are there to be eaten; spaceships could not 
be thought of at all (since this would require technical expertise merging thoughts about material qualities with thought 
about airborne navigation). There would be no metaphors or analogies, as by their very nature, these ideas require a 
structural similarity between ontologically different entities being recognized and transferred from one semantic context 
to the other (Gentner, 1988). How may such modularized minds look “from within“? 
Granted, we will never know what it is really like for a bat to be a bat (Nagel, 1974) – or even what it is like for another 
human to be that someone: We face the “other mind problem” (Harnad, 2016). At best, we can make piecemeal 
inferences from, e.g. a paramecium's stimulus-reaction pattern to how its innenwelt is constructed like the ingenious 
Jakob von Uexküll (1909) attempted to do. However, when the task at hand is “just“ to compare a non-modularized 
mind to a modularized mind, we are able to make one point about which we can be sure: that the life-world of a being 
with a modularized mind is actually many lifeworlds. If animals' minds are largely modular and lack pervasive meta-
integration of module outputs, we can at least say that animals' respective realities are heterogenous, compartmentalized, 
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indeed, that there is one reality respective to every modularized category of thought (cf. Mithen, 1996). Every module, 
which processes one aspect of our reality (e.g. movement, color, others‟ minds, etc.), essentially holds within itself one 
distinct representation of “world“. These “worlds“ are computationally independent of each other, and are 
phenomenally not integrated across modules unless an animal's mental architecture is endowed with a meta-
representing device for merging these world-parts into one phenomenal world. 
Of course this view is schematic, as there are many forms of mental architecture ranging between complete 
modularization (as we may find in “lower“ animals such as paramecium) and virtually complete integration of module 
outputs as in humans. We can be sure that the more similar animals' minds are to ours, the more they tend to have 
architectures exhibiting partial integration of modules' outputs. Still, if the modularity thesis is true, we must 
acknowledge the fact that in addition to every animal having his or her respective reality, for each module of an 
animal's mind that remains informationally encapsulated, there exists one module-bound world nested within that 
reality. 
We have yet to look at the second realm of the lifeworld: the phenomenal inside-view of minds when they contemplate 
themselves. If it is true that much of mental processes are modular, and if mental architectures differ such that humans, 
but not animals are endowed with the capacity to meta-integrate concepts and thus exhibit full cognitive fluidity, then a 
human, but not an animal, can perceive herself as one integral person. If modules are informationally encapsulated and 
their outputs are not integrated across cognitive domains, animal subjectivity may only provide distinct animal “selves” 
pertaining to each of these modules, corresponding to the different “worlds” respective to each such module.  
Summing up our phenomenal consideration of inner and outer lifeworld realms, an animal individual would actually not 
be a person living within his or her lifeworld, but would be module-wise persons living in their corresponding 
lifeworlds. When facing animals, we face a “multiple-other-minds-problem” (Harnad, personal communication). Again, 
I do assume that animals such as those with which we intentionally interact, dogs, birds, horses, etc. do possess at least 
partial integration of their cognitive modules and hence have some meta-representations available that are similar to 
ours. What I am questioning, however, is whether these animals perceive themselves as beings with one perspective vis-
a-vis one world – as we do owing to our cognitive fluidity. 
3. The Solution: Merged Minds 
Before we turn to analyzing the profound implications of animals' modularity of mind for the possibility of meaningful 
human-animal interactions, let me pause to restate what I do not question.   
I argue that the possibility that animals' minds are modular, lack meta-integration of module outputs and hence, 
cognitive fluidity, impacts on our understanding of the quality of animal subjectivity. Critically however, modularity of 
animal minds does not preclude the existence of animal subjectivity. Animals may experience subjective states: be 
sentient or even conscious. The ideas laid out here are neutral as to the question of whether and how animal subjectivity 
is constituted. But if there is an argument for animal subjectivity, then it is safe to say that modularity is not in its way. 
Modularity just suggests that there is not one monolithic animal subjectivity, i.e. no integrated stream of consciousness 
as we humans experience. Instead, there may be module-wise animal subjectivities, in the plural, i.e. one subjectivity 
for each module. In other words, the possibility of animal minds being modularized and hence, of their being not one 
person but many persons, allows the animal to have subjective experiences pertaining to to each of these persons.  
How, then, can we make sense of animal personhood? Adopting a relational perspective provides the key, i.e. looking at 
interactions or “encounters“ (Jürgens, 2016), between humans and animals rather than just focusing on “the animal” and 
on its intrinsic properties in isolation. A relational perspective is, I think, inherent in virtually all approaches to 
establishing animal personhood, which seem to admittedly or implicitly recognize that we may relate to animals as we 
relate to other humans. At the heart of objective and robust scientific scholarship thus often lies an ideal reminiscent of 
Thomas Berry's “communion of subjects“ (Berry, 1999, p. 82). 
An anthrozoological communion presupposes meaningful human-animal encounters. Essentially, human-animal 
encounters are literally meaningful, constituted when mutually significant information flows between the human's and 
the animal's minds, i.e. when their minds “merge” such that their respective subjectivities become intersubjectivity. In 
order for intersubjectivity to emerge, two related requirements must be met: The same elements of the outside world 
need to be represented in two beings‟ respective lifeworlds in ways specific to these beings. Specifically, the beings 
need to be able to represent each others' presence and to put themselves in a relation to the others' presence. If these 
requirements are met, the two beings can respond to each other's interactive intentions and their mere concomitance 
becomes coexistence. It is not required for the animal to think human-like thoughts like “I see there is a member of the 
human species attempting to feed me – that's nice, I'll go make friends with her.“ It suffices for the animal to understand 
that “there is something which indicates the need to flee“ or even just “there is something“ evoking an unconscious 
flight response. The more elaborate the animal's mental architecture in terms of meta-integration of module outputs, the 
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more complex the exchange of information, the more integrated the animal's personhood, and the more holistic its 
representation of the human person becomes. On the other end of the continuum, there may be animals who cannot 
meaningfully encounter humans at all if their mind is completely modular and if their respective realities don't overlap 
at all with humans'. A bee, for example, may not be able to even represent a human's presence, even if, say, the human 
sniffs at the same flower from which the bee harvests nectar. Unless the human moves incautiously and causes a flight 
response in the bee, there will be no representation of her in any of the bee's module-wise respective realities. Still, a 
bee might be considered a person.  
The relational perspective which focuses on a potential flow of meaning between the human and animal minds is 
pivotal for showing how modularity of animal minds does not preclude encountering an animal individual as a person, 
even if owing to its mental architecture, it is many persons. Based on the “merging minds” metaphor (Jürgens, under 
review), there are two ways of constituting animal personhood despite the modularity of animal minds, corresponding 
to two modes of communication between humans and animals. 
First, human and animal can communicate module-wise. If both the human and the animal possess a given module M*, 
in functionally analogous versions Mh and Ma, respectively, they may be able to exchange information that is specific to 
M*'s domain. While human mental architecture allows Mh's output to feed into an integral stream of consciousness, it is 
possible for the human to deliberately focus on that domain-specific information provided by Mh. Assuming that the 
animal has a minimum of subjectivity in which Ma's outputs become represented, and if it can understand information 
pertaining to M* sent by the human, then, module-wise understanding of human and animal are possible. Likewise, the 
animal's subjectivity inherent in Ma, which in the human-animal interaction “responds” to the human's subjectivity, 
constitutes the animal's module-specific personhood: Within the respective reality pertaining to Ma, the animal is a 
subjective agent capable of representing the human's presence and the M*-specific interactive intentions emanating from 
her. Note that for this M*-bound interaction, it is neither necessary for the animal to understand that the human 
possesses Mh, nor to represent the human as an integral being inhabiting an integral outside world. All that is required is 
that human and animal represent each other in a partial, M*-wise manner and allow for an M*-specific flow of meaning 
between their respective minds. 
The second way of constituting animal personhood is, in fact, a way of constructing animal personhood. What animal 
minds lack in meta-integration, human minds display in abundance. It seems that humans are hardly able to isolate the 
information emanating from their different modules. Hence our natural tendency to view other being's minds as 
integrated wholes – a tendency I have called the “most inconspicious anthropomorphism” above. But is this tendency 
necessarily a fallacy? After all, even though their mental architecture makes them experience themselves and the 
outside world in a module-wise manner, animal individuals behave in a homogenous way. Their respective realities are 
so smoothly dovetailed that they function as integrated entities towards the outside world and as a result, we, as outside 
observers, perceive them to be wholes. In other words: Animal minds constitute integrated wholes who just cannot 
represent this wholeness to themselves. When we communicate with animals and (mis)represent their inner worlds as a 
homogenous stream of experience, what we actually do is meta-integrate their respective realities for them. Animals 
might lack complete cognitive fluidity, but in human-animal encounters, that is no problem: We, the human end of the 
interaction, are capable (and in fact: committed by virtue of our minds' holistic architecture) to meta-integrate the 
domain-specific outputs of the animal mind's modules when we represent this information in our respective reality. This 
way, even the bee, whose respective realities presumably don't overlap with the human's, but whom we perceive as a 
fascinating functional whole may be endowed with bee personhood. 
But isn't this a fraudulent confusion of epistemology and ontology? If modularity of animal minds is real, then, after all, 
animal minds are not integrated wholes, they just appear to be. There are two answers to this scepticist conundrum. A 
pragmatic answer just says: Thinking about animal minds as integrated wholes and, hence, about animals as equal 
partners in human-animal encounters, works and makes sense to us (cf. Jürgens, 2016);  therefore we need not worry 
about its realness. Possibly, this conception of animal minds has been a critically useful way of thinking for early 
human survival, as animist heuristics may have helped our ancestors to skillfully predict animal behavior and to hunt 
successfully (Mithen, 1996).  
Then, there is a realist answer to the question of whether a meta-integration of an animal's module-wise realities by and 
in a human mind might count as valid meta-integration. Granted, if meta-integration of module-outputs occurs by and in 
the human mind, this makes no phenomenal or epistemological difference to the animal. Specifically, a human's 
integration of an animal's module-wise respective realities does not cause the animal to experience one homogenous 
reality. This “vicarious” meta-integration only helps the human to address the animal as if it experienced one 
homogenous lifeworld. Still, meta-integration of the animal modules' output does occur in real terms. Meta-integration, 
as defined above, is what happens when two or more data-formats, or pieces of information, originating in different 
lower-order modules, are fused to form a qualitatively new trans-modular meta-format of this information. This is 
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exactly what happens when a human perceives an animal as a homogenous entity, monolithically responding to her 
interactive intentions. The human perceives the (observable and hence interactionally relevant) outputs of the animal's 
mental modules and maps them onto integral higher-order data-formats, hence: meta-integrates them. The fact that this 
meta-integration occurs “in the wrong mind” is negligible for the purpose of creating a meaningful human-animal 
encounter. If meaningful human-animal-encounters are constituted by the meeting and “merging” of a human and an 
animal mind such that a flow of information may occur between them, then it is irrelevant, where the interface is 
located – as long as there is such an interface at some point along the continuum of the merged minds. 
This is why, for construing animal personhood despite modularity of animal minds, the explicit focus on human-animal 
encounters is essential. In and through human-animal encounters, animals are integral persons since we make them 
entities. Then, animal personhood is no fictitious notion, but a real thing, even though – and because – it is constructed 
by our human minds. 
Accordingly, even if humans and animals may be distinguished by a modularized versus meta-integrated mental 
architecture, in human-animal encounters the smooth flow of information makes them two end-poles of a mind-made 
continuum. Akin to Clark and Chalmer's (1998) notion of an “extended mind”, human-animal encounters may 
technically be understood as an anthrozoological coupled system. In other words, our human integral personhood is 
intrinsically provided by virtue of our meta-integrating cognitive architecture, and we also construe the animal's 
personhood by virtue of the same mechanism. Hence, the human and the animal facets of personhood are respective 
sides of the same coin, they cannot straightforwardly be segregated into a person, the human, and a non-person, the 
animal. When human and animal minds merge, animals are persons. 
4. Conclusions 
There are many ways for conceiving of animal personhood (Anderson, 2004; Gruen, 2010; Stucki, 2015) that hold in 
addition to the argument presented here. I have been attempting to show in this discussion that what, at first glance, 
looks like a serious obstacle to construing animal personhood, i.e. the modularity of animal minds and hence the 
category-bound experience of their respective realities and of themselves, is, in fact, a challenge for thinking more 
thoroughly about this notion and for carefully substantiating it. If empirical findings will show that animal minds are not 
modular to the extent assumed here, or exhibit meta-integration of information to an extent that plausibly constitutes 
them as integral persons with a homogenous respective reality – then I shall be the first one to happily reject the 
concerns that motivated this inquiry. Until, however, such evidence will be brought forth, we anthrozoologists need to 
be prepared to answer to objections raised against animal personhood that are based on the modularity of animal minds. 
This essay contributes to this answer by showing how animal personhood may meaningfully be constituted within the 
framework of human-animal encounters.  
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